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WHAT IS AILING THE GERMAN ECONOMY? 
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF GERMAN SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMICS 
By Robert T. Cheek Jr. 
Department of Foreign Languages (German) 
Faculty Mentor: Judith Ricker 
Department of Foreign Languages (German) 
Abstract 
This paper offers a narrative historical description 
of the German Social ,\farket Economy.from its inception 
following JI(Jrld War II, up to the recent Agenda 2010 reforms 
enacted under the administration of Chancellor Gerhard 
Schroder. It is the purpose of this work to explore why the 
German Social Market System enjoyed such a high degree of 
success in its early years, and u·hich flaws might be causing 
the chronic pmb/ems of low growth and high unemployment 
that have plagued Germany more recently. In particular. the 
paper argues that a high-cost and highly inflexible labor 
market resulting from Gennany :S system of autonomous 
collectil'e wage bargaining may be stymieing business growth 
and scaring mrayforeign investment. 
Introduction 
The health ofthe German economy is a topic of special 
concern, not only for the people and politicians of Germany, 
but also for all of the member countries of the European 
Union. As the largest economy in Europe, Germany's 
economic strength has significant influence on the \veil-being 
of its neighbors. Since the mid-1970s, the German economy 
has sutfered under struggling gross domestic product (GOP) 
growth rates, with persistently high unemployment figures. 
At the end of2006, eight percent of German workers were 
unemployed. with unemployment rates in areas of the East 
as high as 20%. Since reunification. Germany's real GOP 
growth rate has averaged a meager 1.8% (OECD Statistics 
2007). Economists and politicians alike point to the severe 
weakness of the eastern German economy as a major cause 
for the current situation. The cost of unification is estimated 
to have exceeded E 1.5 trillion, and every year the German 
government pumps €70 to €80 billion into the region costs 
which consume four percent of the GOP annuall; (E~onomist 
May 8. 2004). The high unemployment in the area has spurred 
many of the young and skilled workers of the East to migrate 
elsewhere, resulting in a dramatic aging of this population 
and a loss in creative force. Apart from the problem of the 
East. many experts point to an inflexible labor market as a 
major cause for high unemployment numbers and see heavy 
bureaucratic regulations imposed by the German government 
as stymieing new business growth. Furthermore, weaknesses 
such as high l~bor costs, poor worker flexibility, a heavy tax 
burden, and h1gh energy costs are all cited as detractors which 
are keeping foreign and domestic investors from setting up 
production facilities within Germany (Economist Aug. 20 
2005). 
In order to better understand the current problems 
facing Germany's economy, it is useful to consider the 
history of Germany's modem political and economic system. 
Foil owing the defeat of Germany in 1945, the country was 
occupied by the victorious Allied forces. Tom apart by the 
emerging Cold War conflict, two states emerged from the 
ruins of the Third Reich: the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) in the East, a communist regime with strong ties to 
the Soviet Union, and the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG) in the West with a liberal democratic constitution. 
Although both states quickly recovered from the devastation 
left by the Second World War, Western Germany stood 
out in the following decades as a Wirtschaftswunder, or 
"economic miracle," quickly becoming one of the strongest 
economies in Europe. This period of economic growth would 
continue all the way into the early 1970s. At the core of the 
new development strategy for West Germany was the swift 
introduction of the Social Market Economy, combined with 
substantial financial transfers under the Marshal Plan and 
a currency reform enacted in 1948. Fueled by a heightened 
world-wide demand for industrial goods brought on by the 
Korean War, the period of the German economic miracle 
was characterized by skyrocketing increases in industrial 
productivity, along with historically low unemployment 
rates. Between 1950 and 1960 industrial production in West 
Germany had risen to two-and-a-halftimes the level of 1950, 
GOP grew by two-thirds, and the unemployment rate fell from 
10.3 percent to an astonishing 1.2 percent (Haselbach 158). 
Beyond its immediate success, the Social Market 
Economic System gained both popularity and recognition 
from the population at large in Germany. The degree of 
importance this system holds in the minds of the German 
people is best understood in light of the circumstances 
under which this system emerged. At the end of Nazi rule in 
Germany, recognizing the scale and gravity of the atrocities 
committed under it, the German people could not deny that as 
a group they had made a terrible mistake. In effect, this largely 
destroyed any sense of national pride upon which Germans 
could base their national identity. All chances had been lost 
to formulate a positive identification with "Germanness" and 
Germany's recent history. 
1
Cheek: What is Ailing the German Economy? A Critical Analysis of German
Published by ScholarWorks@UARK, 2007
FOREIGN LANGUAGES: Robert T. Cheek, Jr. 47 
However, a society cannot function for very long 
without a positive sense of collective identity, and in the wake 
of the post-war destruction and hardship, it was the return 
of prosperity under the economic miracle which would fill 
this void in the mindset of the German people. The renewed 
economic vitality which emerged under the institution of the 
German Social Market Economy allowed Germans to take 
pride in their collective industry and economic strength. The 
success of the German economy under the Social Market 
System came to form the founding myth upon which Germans 
based their collective national identity. 
In its popular conception, the German Social Market 
Economy meant a departure from both the regulated Nazi 
economy and the planned Soviet economy. This system 
sought to balance a basic capitalist free-trade orientation with 
a set of state-managed social safety nets. It is important to 
note that this popular conception was not identical with the 
meaning that Social Market Economy had for the group of 
economists who had invented the term. However, as distorted 
as the public understanding of the term might have been, the 
ideological success of the German Social Market Economy 
among the German people was just as important to the success 
of the newly-formed FRG as the actual implementation of the 
system. 
In the years immediately following the Second World 
War, the economic outlook for the majority of Germans was 
exceptionally bleak. The successful restoration of bearable 
living conditions for the German people, even in the most 
optimistic of expectations, appeared to be many years away. 
Everyday life was characterized by misery, destruction, and 
hunger. The task of clearing the rubble from German cities 
alone was expected to take a generation's work. According 
to the idealized version of the narrative that would become 
the founding myth of modem Germany, it was during this 
most desperate hour that the political initiative and vision 
of Ludwig Erhard returned the war-tom society to a path 
of economic success. Through the currency reform of 1948 
and his liberal program for a new economic policy, Erhard 
catalyzed a period of unprecedented growth and prosperity 
which would last into the 1970s. The Social Market Economic 
System as instituted by Erhard had saved the people of West 
Germany from hunger and despair and made them successful 
and thus respectable once again. In light of these extraordinary 
achievements, it becomes understandable why a German 
author recently declared the Social Market Economy to be "up 
~0 now, the most successful conception of economic policy 
In the history of mankind" (Haselbach 157). 1 As extreme as 
this statement may sound, it is representative of a widely held 
belief within Germany.2 
Considering the importance Germans placed on their 
economic system, it is easy to understand the great level of 
concern caused when that system began to falter. In 1966, 
Erhard himself had to resign his position as chancellor over 
a mild economic crisis. However, this event would pale in 
significance when compared with what was to come. The first 
major blow to the German economy came in 1975, following 
a dramatic upsurge in oil prices in the previous year. In 1975, 
West Germany's GOP fell to negative 1.4 percent growth 
(Ulman and Knut 22). Although GOP growth had recovered 
by the following year, it began a downward trend which 
led to another recession in the early I 980's. Throughout the 
following years leading up to reunification, West Germany 
continued to experience low growth rates, averaging only 
I .9% GOP growth for the decade. Simultaneously in this 
period, unemployment in West Germany doubled, growing 
from 3.4% at the start of the decade to 6.8% by 1989. 
During the time leading up to reunification in the 
German Democratic Republic, there was a growing sense 
of disenchantment with the communist eastern German 
government, and its planned economy. East Germans had 
suffered for years under a period of relative economic decline 
in the face of growing wealth and prosperity in the West. 
The Easterners were convinced that they had been kept from 
living up to their economic potential by the system which 
had been imposed on them following the Second World War. 
The foundational myth of the FRG was believed here as it 
was in West Germany. Many felt that once the constraints of 
the Soviet-style system of central planning were lifted, they 
too would experience the vigorous growth achieved by the 
West following the war. In short, many in the East predicted 
a second "economic miracle" to occur following reunification 
and the implementation of free markets under a I ibcral 
democratic government. 
These views were widely held and propagated in the 
West as well. Following the fall of the Berlin wall, Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl helped win the election for his party's eastern 
subsidiaries by promising a currency reform in the summer of 
1990, calling back the memory of the I ~48 currency ref~rm , 
and its subsequent success. For the pubhc, ··currency reform 
with the introduction of the economic and social laws of the 
West, i.e., the "social market economy." seemed to guarantee 
a repeat of the first miracle in the West. Chance~lor Kohl .. 
proclaimed that the East would .be tra~sf?rmed mto a h!Uhende 
Landschaft (blooming countrystde) w1thm a few years of 
I Th. . . _ R- , · Verteidiger des \!ittlestandes,- in Perspekrfl·e ::000. ed. 
15 quotation, translated by Dieter Haselbach, was taken from Helmuth Seliger, Al~xander. utow-em l' . h K e ;ion in der Geschichte der \!enschheit 
Lothar Bossie (Wiirzburg: Creator Verlag, 1987), p. 116: "Die bislang erfolgre~chste Wirtschaftspo_wsc e onz P 
2 . (ist) [ ... ] unstreitig die von Ludwig Erhard in die. Wirklichkeit ~mgesetzte Soziale Markw.utscha~~!arket Econom .-was .. die erfolg,ersprechendste 
To give one more example: In 1977, the prominent pohtical wnter Rudiger Altmann stated. that 'Soc:al' 1 .. k ~ St trkunst fJirkung Ludwig Erhards. Wirtschaftspolitik des Kontinents- (the most promising economic policy of the contment"). ffmschaftspo 111 "' aa · · 
Aus Anla{Jseines acht:igsten Geburtstags (Bonn: Ludwig Erhardt-Stiftung, 1977), P· 5. 
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social and monetary union with the West. At this time, Ludwig 
Erhard's book from 1957, Wohlstandfiir aile (Prosperity for 
All), appeared newly in print and was distributed freely in 
East German streets. It was a widely held belief among the 
German people, both eastern and western, looking back on 
the German Wirlschafiswunder of the 1950s, that history was 
about to repeat itself (Haselbach 177). 
However, the problems of stagnant GOP growth and 
rising unemployment, which had surfaced in the FRG in the 
1980s, were only intensified following German unification. 
Since reunification in 1990, Germany has seen annual average 
real growth of only 1.8% and unemployment rates have 
averaged 7.5% over the same period (OECD Statistics 2007). 
Before unification, West Germany had maintained a great 
degree of social stability by alleviating social friction through 
the redistribution of wealth. The resulting welfare state with 
its generous unemployment benefits, universal health care, 
comprehensive social security, and indexed pensions was 
in tum dependent on a certain level of economic growth to 
finance existing programs (Witt 368). The expansion of social 
programs and entitlements to East Germany added pressure 
to the already strained social budgets while straining relations 
between East and West Germans. West Germans had to pay 
more into the social budgets during a time when benefits 
were being rolled back. And in the new federal states, the 
application of West German social legislation contrasted 
unfavorably with the much more comprehensive welfare 
system that had previously existed in the GDR (Haselbach 
175). 
Many problems now face Germany as it seeks to 
lower its unemployment, attract foreign investment, and 
return growth rates to acceptably high levels. In this paper, 
some of these important problems that Germany is currently 
facing are explored. Section I will focus on the differences 
bt:tween the mythos of the German Social Market Economy 
and the actual preconditions and policy actions which spurred 
the Wirtschatlswunder of the 1950s. Using this information 
as a basis, I intend to shed some light on why the second 
"economic miracle" never occurred. Section II addresses 
one of Germany's most pressing problems today, facing its 
very expensive and highly inflexible labor market. It will be 
suggested that the current system of autonomous collective 
wage bargaining is hindering Germany's gro\\1h potential 
and thu_s explains Germany's trouble reforming this system. 
In Sectwn Ill, German economic reform strategy enacted 
in 2005, known as the ''Agenda 2010,'' will be described 
including consideration of some of the specific goals set ~ut in 
~his agenda and the progress that has been made in Germany 
m response to these measures. The paper concludes with an 
outlook on the u~comin.g challenges facing Germany as it 
adapts to a post-mdustnally structured society in the modem 
era of global capitalism. 
Section I: The myth versus the reality behind the German 
Economic Miracle 
In the years directly following the Second World War, 
the main task facing western policy-makers was to ensure 
the basic living conditions of the population while building 
up a new state and economy. Socialist and communist 
politicians argued for a central distribution system, extensive 
state controls, and the nationalization of banks and industry. 
Leading their opposition, in favor of a liberal or capitalist 
system, were two economist-politicians considered the fathers 
of the Social Market Economy: Ludwig Erhard, who had 
been appointed Minister of Economics in the first cabinet 
of Konrad Adenauer and who would later serve as German 
Chancellor, and Andreas Miiller-Armack, permanent secretary 
in the Ministry of Trade and Commerce. These two figures 
held between them the most powerful positions in determining 
Germany's economic policy (Rosch l-2). 
The task of restoring West Germany to a path of 
economic success at this time must have seemed very 
daunting, both to the German people and to politicians like 
Erhard and Adenauer. Following the Second World War, 
daily life for Germans was characterized by the death and 
destruction left behind by the war, shortages of food and 
decent housing, and a growing national shame as the scope 
and scale ofNazi atrocities came more fully to light. And 
yet, very soon after these darkest of days, the West German 
economy was booming, unemployment was virtually 
nonexistent, and the German people could once again take 
pride in their collective industry and economic success as 
growth and productivity rates soared. The 1950s mark the 
decade of the German Economic Miracle, a miracle which 
many felt had come about thanks to the return of free markets 
under the Social Market Economy. 
As successful as the Social Market Economy may 
have been in the time directly following its inception, its 
disappointing performance in recent years has called into 
question how much of the early success was due to the system 
itself, and how much had been caused by other factors. From 
the early 1970s until very recently, economic growth in 
Germany remained stagnant and unemployment rates hovered 
persistently between six and nine percent (See Appendix 1 ). 
Furthermore, during German reunification in the early 1990s, 
a time when German politicians and people alike predicted 
a second economic miracle following the introduction of 
western liberal markets in the East the economic woes of 
West Germany were only compou~ded as it struggled to 
modernize the severely outdated Eastern industrial base. 
Eastern Germans, rather than experiencing unprecedented 
growth and prosperity, as had occurred years earlier in the 
West, suffered under growing unemployment rates that 
skyrocketed to as high as twenty percent in many areas 
(Ulman 14). 
Questions concerning these developments in 
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Germany over the last decades abound: What were the 
factors that catalyzed the Economic Miracle of the 1950s in 
West Germany? Why could this success not be duplicated 
years later in the East? And most importantly, how might 
united Germany change its system to restore growth and 
unemployment rates to acceptable levels? 
To answer such questions, one must first consider the 
factors stimulating the success of the 1948 currency reform. 
After the collapse of Germany in 1945, the German economy 
rapidly deteriorated into a barter economy. During this period, 
German money was rendered virtually useless, serving neither 
as a means of payment nor as a store of value. Individuals and 
firms were forced to acquire most of the commodities they 
needed by exchange against commodities they had to offer. 
Often it was more profitable for employees to skip work for 
part of the week so that they could cultivate private gardens, 
or barter for commodities on the black market. By the middle 
?f 1948 the economy had reached a state of paralysis resulting 
Ill near-starvation for a large part ofthe population (Lutz 122). 
It was against this backdrop that the currency reform of 1948 
was enacted. 
One of the key reasons why the miracle of economic 
recovery in Germany became so convincing was the claim 
that West Germany was starting from scratch at the time of 
the currency reform. On the 20th of June in 1948, the day of 
the currency reform, each West German citizen received forty 
D~utsche Marks, the new money to replace the inftation-
stncken Reichsmark (Haselbach 161 ). Referring to the Social 
Market mythos, this was the first day in Germany when free 
markets were able to work their magic. In the course ofthis 
d~y, the black market suddenly disappeared in correspondence 
With the return of the supply of food and commodities. 
Shop windows that had been empty the day prior were now 
adorned with a new abundance of much-needed merchandise. 
Foll~wing years of want and starvation, this day did seem like 
a miracle to the millions of Germans who lived through it. 
Although the astounding change accomplished on 
the day of the currency reform did much to restore the 
co.nfidence and optimism of the German people, calling it a 
~rracle ignores many of the key elements that contributed to 
Its fruition. The currency reform did not kick off recovery. 
Rather, it was one carefully staged step in the process of 
returning Germany to the path of economic grmvth (Haselbach 
162). 
One of the most significant factors contributing to 
Germany's successful economic recovery following the war 
was the presence of a modern and relatively intact industrial 
base. Under National Socialism, particularly during the war, 
Germany's economy had been very successful for two main 
reasons. For one, through their military acquisitions during 
the war, the Nazis had access to an abundant supply oflabor 
in the occupied territories and were able to exploit a wealth 
of raw materials to which they had gained access. Also, the 
system of economic planning under the Nazis had been quite 
successful. The Nazis succeeded in combining the resources 
at their disposal with the initiative of the German economy 
that they had inherited. Although the destruction resulting 
from Allied bombardments in the final weeks of the war had 
been devastating to both the housing and the transportation 
infrastructures, much of the industry proper was lett relatively 
untouched. All in all, due to Nazi successes, Germany's 
postwar economy inherited a highly modem industrial stock.J 
To a great extent, it was this inherited industrial base that set 
the stage for the subsequent successes experienced under the 
Social Market System (Haselbach 163). 
The immediate and visible success of the currency 
reform in 1948 can be attributed to other factors preceding 
that landmark day. As early as 1947, the economy had 
already turned a comer toward recovery thanks to a carefully 
crafted policy of central allocation of scarce resources. 
The introduction of the new currency would not have been 
effective without the preexisting recovering economy to back 
it (Ibid 164). 
The sudden appearance of commodities in shop 
windows on the day of the reform can be understood in light 
of the manner in which the reform was introduced. German 
politicians had openly announced the coming of a major 
day of economic reckoning months before the reform itself. 
This information had sent wholesalers and producers a clear 
signal to hoard commodities. Knowing that the reform was 
imminent, traders did not want to sell against the dying 
Reichsmark, waiting instead to exchange their goods for the 
newly established Deutschmark (OM). In the month preceding 
the reform, the supply of goods in retail shops had dried up 
almost completely, only to be newly replenished with the 
introduction of the new currency (Lutz 132). 
Along with initiating the return of commodities to 
German shops, the currency reform marked the beginning of 
substantial increases in productivity and output in the German 
economy. Before the close of the year in 1948, industrial 
production had already risen by an astounding 53 pe~ce~t (Ibid 
133). This rapid growth was set off by a number of significant 
factors. Prior to the currency reform. part of productiOn 
undoubtedly went into hidden stocks, or was used for bartering 
purposes, and was not reported. Thus output figures preceding 
the reform most likely underrepresented actual output. Also, 
the introduction of the new currency significantly lowered the 
rate of absenteeism in the work place. Following the currency 
reform, the rate of absenteeism dropped from 9.5 hours a 
week in May to only 4.2 hours by October. The new currency 
3 1 . . . ood th d f th ·ar following the war, much of eastern 
n contrast to the West, where occupying Allied forces left much of the German mdustnal as 1t st at e en ° e w • 
Germany's industrial stock was disassembled and carried off by the Russians. 
4
Inquiry: The University of Arkansas Undergraduate Research Journal, Vol. 8 [2007], Art. 9
http://scholarworks.uark.edu/inquiry/vol8/iss1/9
50 INQUIRY Volume 8 2007 
had made it once again worthwhile to work for money, rather 
than spend time foraging and bartering. Moreover, with 
the return of a functioning currency came a drop in the real 
costs associated with executing business transactions. Time 
formerly spent arranging complicated barter agreements could 
finally be used toward more productive ends (Ibid 133). 
The visible efTects of the reform evident in shop 
windows, combined with substantial increases in output 
productivity and quality of life, helped to convince the public 
at large that the new currency was reliable. This, in turn, 
boosted consumer confidence, further aiding the progress 
of economic recovery. Economic growth in Germany 
was additionally aided by an increased world demand for 
manufactured goods, stimulated by the Korean War. For much 
of this period, German exports also enjoyed a competitive 
advantage in international markets because the German 
currency was undervalued, making German goods cheaper in 
foreign markets (Haselbach 163-166). 
Given this extraordinary set of circumstances, Germany 
was well positioned for a boom as it entered the 1950s. 
This growth potential certainly could have been spoiled by 
ineffective economic policies, and much credit is due to 
both Erhard and the West German government at that time. 
However, crediting the theoretical formula of the Social 
Market Economy for the success enjoyed during this decade 
is wrong for two reasons: because it ignores the governing 
set of circumstances preceding the expansion, and because 
the policy actions of Ludwig Erhard were less driven by a 
coherent theory of economic practice than by an astonishing 
pr~gmatism (Ibid 164). Although the Social Market Economy 
mtght well be described as a variation of market liberalism 
and under Erhard markets were indeed liberalized whereve~ 
economically feasible, he did not hesitate to resort to state 
c~ntrol and planning in fields where it seemed appropriate to 
htm, such as in housing, coal supply, or agriculture. Social 
market theory recommends the establishment of markets 
framed by institutional regulations, with these regulations 
standing as the only checks against the self-destructive 
h:ndencies in market economies. However, Erhard did not 
follow this form of governance, instead using state action in 
the market proper as a standard tool of his policy (Ibid 164). 
These conditions surrounding the introduction of 
the Social Market Economy are important to remember 
whe_n consid:ring the disappointing outcome following 
th_e mtroductwn of the West German currency in the East 
att:r reun_ificatio~ in the_ 1990s. Most notably, the currency 
reform ~t I 948 dtd not, m and of itself, catalyze recovery. 
~ther, tt was me~ely a step amongst a large set of preexisting 
circumstances whtch, as an aggregate, produced the vigorous 
growth rates of the 1950s. 
How different was the situation in eastern Germany 
in the time leading up to reunification! Virtually none of the 
factors contributing to West Germany's success in the 1950s 
were present in East Germany leading up to the 1990s. East 
Germany had suffered from a long period of relative economic 
decline in the face of the growing wealth in the West, which 
left it with an outdated industrial stock, as opposed to the 
modernized stock of West Germany following World War 
II. Rather than possessing an undervalued currency to boost 
competitiveness in international markets, East Germany 
was burdened, under the "currency reform," with the highly 
appreciated DM, making East German goods more expensive 
in foreign markets. The introduction of this new currency not 
only failed to help the eastern German economy, but it hurt the 
area and contributed to a sharp decline of economic activity. 
It was only the comparative strength of the West German 
economy and an enormous and ongoing transfer of wealth that 
kept East Germany's economy from a total breakdown, since 
it was fully exposed to the world market after currency reform 
(Haselbach 178). 
The disappointing performance of East Germany 
following market liberalization and the introduction of 
a western currency illustrates the point that growth and 
economic success are not guaranteed by trade liberalization 
if other necessary preconditions are not also met. In the 
same way, it was not so much the Social Market Economy 
that was responsible for West Germany's success, but rather 
a combination of the aforementioned preconditions in 
combination with an appropriate economic policy. 
Section II: The high cost of labor in Germany 
When asked what could be causing the chronically high 
rates of unemployment experienced in Germany over the last 
several decades, political and economic experts alike point to 
~high-cost and highly inflexible labor market.4 Simply put, 
tt has become too expensive for many firms to hire workers 
in Germany. Furthermore, once a firm has hired workers in 
the country, an extensive body of labor laws and restrictions 
regulates nearly every aspect associated with maintaining 
those workers, including making it very difficult for firms to 
lay them off (Economist, 2003). Over the years, these factors 
have forced firms in Germany to either reduce employment or 
~ove elsewhere, and have scared away a multitude of outside 
mvestment and employment opportunities. 
The vast array of labor market problems in existence 
~oday may be attributed to the nature and development of 
mdustrial relations in Germany. The Social Market Economic 
sy~tem, which emerged from the post-war period under the 
gut dance of Ludwig Erhard, is often described as a blending 
of ideas from liberal thought (most notably, stressing a basic 
free-trade orientation) with a set of social precepts that modify 
4 
The debate ov·er Gennany's attractiveness as a location for investment in r · · · . . 
found in a wide array of academic publications For a ood d . p oductlon faclltttes 15 encapsulated by the phrase ~standort Deutschland" and can be 
· g escnptton of the Issue see Harding (1999), Tiiselmann (1995, 1998), and Zumwinkle (1995). 
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the outcome of the market process through redistributive 
measures for the sake of balance and social security. These 
social precepts indicative of the Social Market Economy were 
incorporated via a system of extensive social welfare, along 
with a system of autonomous collective wage bargaining (Witt 
366). 
This system of collective bargaining, which comprises 
the defining element of German industrial relations won , 
support in the aftermath ofthe Nazi era as a counterweight 
to the power of the state and large-scale industry in the 
operation of the Social Market Economy. While it was the 
responsibility of the government under this system to socialize 
risks and provide economic security to wage earners (i.e., to 
provide social welfare), this power was counterbalanced by 
the constitutionally guaranteed autonomy oftrade unions and 
employer associations in the determination of wages under 
collective bargaining. The latter institution was intended to 
function as an instrument of social justice by establishing 
parity of bargaining power between workers and employers. 
It_ was also the intent of this system to help reduce income 
differentials and tensions between the two classes and avert 
industrial unrest (Koch 234-254). Although the system of 
collective wage bargaining has proved successful in many 
of these respects, this institution has also had a number of 
unfortunate consequences. 
As a direct result of Germany's system of industrial 
relations, the cost of labor in Germany, represented by wages 
or salaries and non-wage benefits, has risen over the past thirty 
years to one of the highest levels in the world. West German 
workers cost on average €27.60 an hour, compared with 
€19.90 in Britain and € 18.80 in America (Economist, Aug 
2005). A large portion of these labor costs can be attributed 
to so-called "non-wage labor costs." According to the annual 
analysis by the Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft, non-wage 
labor costs are defined as those categories ofthe enterprise's 
total labor costs other than direct compensation (Chen 2). 
From 1972 to 2000, the ratio of non-wage labor costs to direct 
compensation grew by 25.6 percentage points to 81.2%. This 
represents the highest level of non-wage labor costs in the 
Euro-zone (Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft 2001, table 148). 
Apart from expensive labor, corporations in Germany 
must shoulder a heavy tax burden and a set of highly inflexible 
market regulations. As of 2004, the basic level of corporate tax 
stood at 38.7%, the highest rate in Western Europe (Economist 
May 8 2004). Furthermore, labor regulations developed 
~nder the German system of industrial relations have made 
It extremely difficult for firms to fire workers once they are 
employed. For example, at the end of2003, it took Software 
AG, a globally active firm based in Darmstadt, three months 
to lay off200 of its employees. In the U.S., the same measure 
took the company only two weeks to complete. The fact that it 
was possible for Software AG to make these lay-offs at all was 
only due to the enactment of Agenda 20 I 0 reforms earlier that 
year, which loosened job protections enough to allow the lay-
offs to occur (Economist May 8 2004). In the modem era of 
increasingly free trade and global capitalism, firms are gaining 
considerably more freedom to locate their production facilities 
in areas where factor costs are most efficient. The combination 
of high costs and inflexibility has both discouraged outside 
firms from investing in Germany and caused many of 
Germany's domestic firms to move their operations elsewhere, 
for instance to central European countries where labor costs 
average below €5 per hour (Economist, Aug. 20 2005). 
At first glance, Germany's system of autonomous 
collective bargaining between employers' associations and 
trade unions may seem to be both an effective and efficient 
method for protecting worker interests. Indeed, the system 
has enjoyed great popularity and acclaim over the years of 
its existence, both within Germany and in other European 
countries where it has often been cited as an exemplarily 
stable and highly functional model for the regulation of 
working conditions. The principle of co-determination 
between management and employees, carried out on the 
company level in Germany through the works council 
(Betriebsrat), most notably in the 1960s, helped create a 
strong foundation within German companies by maintaining 
harmony between workers and employers (Economist May 8 
2004). Further, because the whole process is self-regulated by 
the union and employer groups directly involved, it relieves 
the state of the burden of regulating and legitimating labor 
standards (Winter 183). 
As numerous as arguments in favor of Germany's 
model of industrial relations may be, there remain manifold 
aspects of the system that are clearly problematic in both a 
theoretical and an empirical sense. Throughout the course of 
years of repeated wage negotiations, union representatives 
have succeeded in obtaining an income distribution 
significantly higher than the competitive outcome, and have 
shielded union workers through extensive labor laws to a 
great extent against layoffs and other job risks. Unit labor 
costs in Germany, which stood at 60 percent of the U.S. level 
in 1970, reached over 140 percent by 1990. In this same 
period, productivity growth in German~ was lower than i~ the 
U.S. (Ulman 12). While these accomplishments are certamly 
very beneficial to union members. their effects have proven 
devastating to firms that must compete on the global market. 
Furthermore, this method of socially correcting free markets 
gives rise to a rent-seeking dilemma that casts doubt on. 
whether the implementation of such a method has anythmg to 
do with the pursuit of social goals at all. 
In his paper titled "Germany's Social ~~arket_Economy: 
Between Social Ethos and Rent Seeking." Ulnch Witt of the 
Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems 
outlines with great clarity the dilemma associated with . . 
Germany's system of collective, centralized ";age b~a~mng. 
He begins with the concession that decisions m negotmtwns 
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are indeed reached by mutual agreement between the labor 
and employer interests. He continues by qualifying that this 
agreement is made by the representatives of the associations 
and not by the individual parties bound by the wage contract. 
Witt argues that in this seemingly insignificant detail lies the 
system's greatest problem: 
The majority opinion within the employer associations 
determines their judgment about the acceptability of 
an agreement. Experience suggests that this opinion is 
based on whether the resulting cost increases (direct 
wages and salaries plus non-wage labor costs) of 
different grades of labor can be recouped without 
loss of profitability in the industry. It is doubtful, 
however, whether the majority opinion, especially 
under the pressure of actual or potential strike, takes 
sufficient account of the variance in the profitability 
of all member firms. Because the member firms are 
not allowed to pay less than the union rate, firms at the 
lower end of the profitability distribution are forced to 
reduce employment or even to go out of business when 
wages and non-wage labor costs rise. This outcome 
occurs even where the employees of these firms are 
willing to work under conditions worse than those 
specified in the agreement. (Witt 372) 
In other words, by requiring wage and benefit increases 
to be implemented across entire industries, many companies 
that under normal circumstances would be economically 
viable are no longer able to make profits, resulting in the 
need to lay off workers, move facilities elsewhere, or even 
terminate operations. Until very recently, despite the fact that 
the unemployment problem has been growing progressively 
worse since the mid-l970s, German labor unions have 
continued their strategy in negotiation rounds of seeking wage 
and benefit increases equal to the estimated average annual 
gain in labor productivity. Union representatives in practice do 
not have to admit responsibility for ill effects resulting from 
their contracts because, in the Social Market Economy, the 
ind~vi~ual unemployment risk is covered by state-managed 
socml msurance and public assistance. To frame the problem 
in the economic terminology of costs and benefits, the benefits 
of an expansive wage policy are reaped privately by union 
members, while the costs are born collectively by German 
taxpayers (Witt 372-373). 
~lthoug~ the ~roblems resulting from the highly 
expensive and mftex1ble German labor market have become 
increas_ingly obvious, efforts towards reforming the system of 
collective wage bargaining behind it have been held back for 
a number of reasons. First and foremost stands the country's 
federal power structure, spread over the 16 independent 
Lander, which was deliberately designed after the Second 
World War to weaken the ability of a central government to 
impose radical reform. Numerous failed attempts to reform 
Germany's labor laws in recent years have proven this system 
to be all too effective (Economist May 8 2004). Furthermore, 
the Law on Collective Agreements (Tarifvertragsgesetz), 
which forms the legal basis for sectoral relations between 
employers and unions, was incorporated into the German 
Constitution (Gnmdgesetz) in 1949 and has remained largely 
unchanged ever since (Winter 189). Finally, the system of 
collective bargaining has operated in Germany for many 
years, retaining a high degree of popularity in the country. 
As a result, politicians frequently shy away from the issue of 
reforming Germany's cumbersome and expensive labor laws 
(Economist May 8 2004). 
Although the system of collective wage bargaining 
in Germany certainly has resulted in healthy worker/ 
employer relations and a high degree of wage equality across 
employment sectors throughout Germany, the problems 
resulting from the system, such as high unemployment and an 
inflexible labor market, bring into question whether the system 
has helped Germany at all. In spite of the many arguments 
claiming that free competition will ultimately drive wages 
below the cost ofliving,5 one thing is clear: if the problem 
of unemployment in Germany is ever going to be solved, the 
country must move to deregulate its labor markets and lower 
the cost of employment to a more competitive level. Although 
such reforms might sacrifice a certain degree of pay equality, 
the benefits brought on by lower unemployment and higher 
economic growth would certainly result in an increased level 
of"Wohlstandfiir alle" (prosperity for all). 
Section III: Agenda 2010 
In 2005, former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder 
spearheaded a series of reforms known as Agenda 2010. 
The purpose of this reform package was to modernize the 
German social system and labor market. The main aims of 
these reforms were to improve economic growth and thus 
reduce unemployment. The agenda focused on three areas: 
the economy, the system of social benefits, and Germany's 
position in the world market. Specific reform steps to be taken 
included reductions in health care benefits, restructuring labor 
regulations, tax cuts, and an overhaul of the pension system 
(Deutsche Welle Oct. 17 2003). 
In a speech delivered on March 14, 2003 introducing 
the reforms, Schroder asserted that a massive effort from 
all sections of society would be needed to carry out these 
important reforms. Indeed, the span and magnitude of the 
Agenda 2010 reforms were unprecedented and touched on 
a wide range of government actions. Monthly premium 
5 A popular form of this argument denotes competition via free markets and 1 b l · · 
phrase "low wage or no wage~ fl"'uses on the t d ffb g 0 a capttahsm as a "race to the bonom." Another argument, encapsulated by the 
' v~ ra e-o etween greater p n d h" h -pav inequaJitv. For a good summary ofth" d b t B ay equa 1 Y an tg er unemployment versus lower unemployment and greater 
- ., - IS e a e, see rueckner, 2000. 
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payments for the national healthcare system were to be 
gradually reduced from 14.3% of an employee's income 
to 12.15% by 2006. The reduced premium was aimed at 
lowering Germany's staggering non-wage labor costs. To 
finance the cuts, certain non-vital health procedures would 
no longer be financed by the public health fund, and patients 
would be required to co-pay for doctor visits and prescriptions 
Also, to introduce more flexibility into Germany's heavily 
regulated labor market, a reform was passed making it easier 
for companies to hire and fire employees (Eironline Mar. 31 
2003). 
The most controversial section of the reforms, known 
as Hartz IV, merged unemployment and welfare benefits. 
The Hartz IV reforms reduced to 12 months the time during 
which a person can receive maximum unemployment benefits 
following job-loss. In addition, long-term unemployment 
benefits, which formerly paid out as much as 57 percent of 
a person's last regular net income, were reduced to a capped 
level of 345 Euros per month. These benefits were further 
qualified, making those with a working spouse or assets 
exceeding 13,000 Euros ineligible for payments. Also included 
in this reform package was a tax cut changing the country's 
progressive tax rate from 19.9% to 15% at the lowest level 
and from 48.5% to 42% at the highest level. Other reforms 
included eliminating the requirement of a master craftsman's 
diplomas in 65 skilled trades before a worker is allowed to 
be self-employed, an increase in the age of pension eligibility 
from 65 to 67, along with a reduction of pension levels from 
40.1% to 38% of a recipient's former income, and an increase 
in the percentage received by communities oflocal business 
tax from 2.2% to 3.6% (Deutsche Welle Oct. 17 2003). 
The Agenda 2010 reforms have already helped the 
economy make a remarkable turnaround. In 2006, Germany's 
GDP was up by 2. 7%, the highest increase since 2000. 
Productivity also rose by 2%, a remarkable improvement, 
considering productivity growth averaged only 0.7% 
between 1998 and 2004 (Investor Business Daily Apr. 9 
2007). Germany's traditionally strong export sector has also 
been booming, with exports increasing by 12.5% in 2006. 
A recent survey from Ifo., a Munich economics-research 
institute, shows business confidence to have reached a 15-year 
high. This recent succession of improvements serves as an 
indication that Germany is well into the upward curve of a 
typical eight-to-nine year investment cycle (Economist Jan. 5 
2007). 
Two years ago such a turnaround seemed hardly 
possible. In March of2005, unemployment peaked at 12.1 %. 
This alarming rate of unemployment helped convince German 
unions to agree to longer hours and even wage cuts in some 
cases. Such concessions in combination with recent reforms 
have allowed German corporations to make considerable 
improvements in cost competitiveness. Since the end of 
2001, unit labor costs have fallen by 13.4%, compared to a 
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7.7% increase in the U.S. (Investor Business Daily Apr. 9 
2007). Real wages per employee since 2000 have increased 
a modest 6%. This recent practice of wage moderation has 
given German companies a comparative advantage over rivals 
in France, Italy and Spain where, in the same period, wages 
increased by 12%, 18%, and 27% respectively (Economist 
Jan. 5 2007). 
To a great extent, this recovery has been driven by the 
recent successes of Germany's large corporations. Over the 
past two years, they have been making significant structural 
adjustments, cutting costs vigorously, investing abroad and 
holding down wages. Recent government reforms have 
also helped companies regain their competitive edge, by 
introducing more labor flexibility and lowering corporate taxes 
from 38.6% to 29.8% (Investor Business Daily Apr. 9 2007). 
As a result, corporate profits in Germany are healthy and the 
DAX, a stock index for Germany's top 30 companies, climbed 
nearly 30% in 2006 to its highest levels since 2000 (Ibid). 
Although the economic situation in Germany has 
improved considerably over the last year, the outlook for the 
next several years is not entirely rosy. Doubts remain about 
the durability of this recent German revival. The German 
Achilles' heel of low consumer spending has failed to make 
significant improvements in recent years. Although domestic 
consumption has picked up, improvements have been largely 
confined to the areas of transport, communications, leisure 
and entertainment, with consumers still holding back when 
it comes to spending on food, holidays at home, and clothing 
(Economist Jan. 5 2007). Third quarter data from 2006 shows 
expenditures as being up by only 0.8% since 2003, when 
expenditures decreased by 0.5% (Warton Mar. 28 2007). 
This would indicate that recent GDP improvements have 
been largely sustained by German exports, leaving Germany 
susceptible to a downturn in the global economy. Furthermore, 
the strengthening euro in relation to the weakening dollar 
will undoubtedly put increased pressure on Germany's export 
sector in the coming years (Ibid). 
Outlook: The Need for Further Reform 
In a speech given to a conference by the Federation of 
German Industries (BDI) and the Confederation of German 
Employers' Associations (BOA) on October 16, 20?6, Joaquin 
Almunia, the European Commissioner for Economic and 
Monetary Policy, evaluated the progress of the Agenda 20!0 
reforms and proposed a number of further steps the Ge~an 
government should take in reforming its e~onomy .. I~ h1s .. 
speech he praised German etTorts at reduc1~g admmtstratl\ e 
burdens and the costs of starting a new busmess. He stated 
that the overall strength of the recent reform efforts "':as th~. 
determination to raise the country's innovatiYe capactty. C~ttng 
the Commission's assessment of the 2005 reforms, Alumma 
highlighted the need for more competition in ~ermany,. 
p~icuiariy in public procurement. in ~rofesswnal servtces, 
and in the provision of broadband serv1ces. 
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Germany faces the additional long-term challenge 
of boosting its growth potential against the backdrop of 
unfavorable demographics-an aging population and a low 
fertility rate. One way to do this is to encourage business 
investment. Strong investment growth will lead to a faster 
expansion in the capital stock and a correspondingly strong 
rise in production capacities. In order to encourage future 
investment, Germany must continue its efforts in moderating 
labor costs and reducing the burden of restrictive labor laws. 
Although, lower growth in labor costs is unlikely to improve 
domestic demand, over the long-term wage moderation will 
help to strengthen and sustain Germany's competitiveness on 
the global market. If Germany continues to make progress, 
investment will continue to rise and consumer demand will 
benefit from greater growth in disposable incomes (Wharton 
Mar. 28 2007). 
The ambitious measures set forth in the Agenda 2010 
reform package have already done and will continue to do a 
great deal to prepare Germany for the age of global trade and 
competition. The lofty aims of delivering sustainable growth, 
full employment, stability, and security within Germany 
and the European Union, are desirable and deserving of 
the universal efforts ofEU member states toward their 
achievement. Furthermore, in order to preserve Europe's 
uniquely high standard ofliving over the coming years, it is 
absolutely necessary that these issues be addressed and dealt 
with effectively. If carried through, these policy actions will 
continue to both shape the face of Europe positively and to 
serve as a model for nations adapting to a post-industrial 
economic structure for years to come. 
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Mentor Comments 
As Dr. Judith Ricker writes to recommend publication of Mr. 
Cheek's research in Inquiry, her enthusiasm is obvious. 
Robert Cheek, a Chancellors Scholar majoring 
in German, Economics and European Studies, has 
completed an exciting, original, and highly relevant 
research project. In keeping with his broad range 
of interests, he selected a multi-disciplinary project 
spanning half a century and involving all three fields 
titled "What Is Ailing the German Economy? A Critical 
Analysis of German Social,\larket Economics." This 
project allowed him to draw on information gained 
in relevant courses taken on this campus as well as in 
Austria, where he spent his junior year studying at the 
Karl-Franzens-Universitiit in Graz. 
Ever since I have known him, Robert has been keenly 
interested in the economic situation in Germanv. When 
time came for him to select a research project, he 
wanted to e:r:plore whv the German economv had been 
stagnating for years. -It was at a time when-Chancellor 
Schroeder, a socialist, had tried to introduce badlv 
needed changes but had continued to lose voter -
support. In a desperate attempt to solidi.fj.• his position, 
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he called for earlyfederal elections. Robert followed 
the heated debates about the jitture of the German 
economy that ensued and dominated the campaign 
against challenger Angela Aferkel. All major and minor 
parties offered economic remedies. When neither major 
party lron a solid majorif); the country was thrown 
into turmoil. Ultimately, Schroeder stepped down. The 
coalition that was formed required compromises that 
made it dijJicultfor Germany to push through the major 
changes necessal}'for the German economy to begin 
flourishing again. Robert had the unique opportunity 
to monitor policy changes as they evolved when the 
Merkel government took over the reigns. 
As Robert researched his topic, he became more 
and more interested in the history of the German 
economy. Specifical(v. he wanted to explore why the 
Wirtschaftsmmder. the "economic miracle" that 
had defined the post-war German economy, could 
not be duplicated in former East Germany after the 
unification. 
In order to provide an answer to this question, Robert 
had to go back to 1945 to identijj· the factors that lead 
to the Wirtschajiswunder and explore the economic 
schools of thought that subsequently lead to the highly 
Appendix I 
successjitl Social Market Economy of the Federal 
Republic. it is to his credit that he looked beyond the 
myths surrounding the post-war German economic 
boom, studying instead the main theoretical bases for 
the Social Market Economy. 
The next step was for Robert to assess the conditions 
that existed in the former German Democratic 
Republic, comparing them to the conditions in post-
1945 West Germany, as well as the economic conditions 
in the old Federal Republic as the two Germanys were 
reunited. He identified the principle problems that 
prevented a second economic miracle from occurring 
and, along the way, identified what ails the German 
economy. He ended his study with an analysis of recent 
German strategies, principally Schroeder s Agenda 
2010 reform package, to address the challenges that 
mature, post-industrial economies like Germany s face 
due to increased globalization. 
Roberts project was very challenging. He read through 
a vast amount of sophisticated literature, both in 
English and in German that provided him with the 
background information he needed. The fact that had 
the language skills to read widely in both languages 
was critical for the project. 
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